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Abstract 
 
Patient compliance with provider directions is 
central to patients’ well being, and non-compliance 
has been identified as a leading cause of increasing 
healthcare costs. While numerous factors may affect 
patient compliance, we investigate the mediating effect 
of patient health information availability on the 
relationship between perceived uncertainty and 
patients’ motivation to comply with providers’ orders. 
To understand how to mitigate perceived uncertainty, 
we extend the underlying principles of principal-agent 
theory—hidden information and hidden action—and 
propose three uncertainty-mitigating factors: 
perceived information asymmetry, fear of 
opportunism, and physician quality. The proposed 
structural model is empirically tested using data from 
184 patients. Our model is supported, and the results 
provide an understanding of the process by which 
patients engage in their care through the support of 
information technology. We discuss the implications 
for understanding and facilitating the provider-
patient relationship and its effect on patients' 
motivation to comply through the principal-agent 
perspective.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Patient non-compliance with providers’ orders is 
considered one of the major causes of low 
effectiveness of medical care [1,2] and increasing 
healthcare costs [3]. Further, research has shown that 
patient non-adherence contributes to a significant 
portion of admissions and readmissions [4-6] and is a 
source of ongoing frustration with doctors [7].  
Several studies have investigated the potential 
underlying factors of non-adherence [3, 8-11], and 
close to 200 factors have been investigated [12]. 
Nevertheless, no factor has been identified as fully 
predictive and consistently related to patient 
compliance [13-14]. In our review of the literature, we 
found that uncertainty about the provider’s approach 
is an essential driver of a patient’s questioning the 
treatment and makes many patients reluctant to 
comply with the course of treatment. [8, 9, 11, 42, 47, 
49] 
To better understand the sources of patient 
uncertainty and, thus, to help to mitigate its effect on 
patient non-adherence, we examine this issue through 
the principal-agent perspective of agency theory. 
Although agency theory was originally developed for 
the employer-employee relationship [15], we use 
agency theory as it is understood in the information 
economics literature [16-19]. Using agency theory in 
this way fits our study, as the agency approach to 
uncertainty suggests that self-interested parties have 
incompatible goals, with hidden information and 
hidden actions. This approach holds true in any 
industry or socioeconomic systems in which 
information asymmetry and fear of opportunism exist 
in a transactional setting [20]. 
The principal-agent perspective has been 
extensively applied in the healthcare setting, in which 
patients are the principals who delegate the care 
delivery responsibility to providers (agents) in 
exchange for payment. This transaction takes place in 
the context of uncertainty due to the fact that patients 
cannot fully monitor the decision-making process, and 
the provider clearly has more information about the 
diagnosis and chosen course of treatment than does the 
patient. These circumstances led to the fundamental 
information problem of the provider-patient 
transaction-based relationship: (1) the hidden 
information-based diagnosis and treatment selection 
and (2) the hidden action that is a morally questionable 
approach to treating patients [16-17,21]. Patients often 
feel that the recommended treatments involve 
unnecessary medication or extended therapy so that 
providers may get reimbursed for unnecessary 
services.  
Health economists have been evaluating such a 
possibility and have recommended regulations to limit 
such situations with outcome-based reimbursement vs. 
fee-for-service payments. However, the cost of 
monitoring the agent behavior in healthcare outweighs 
the benefit gained from it, leaving room for self-
interested decision making. 
In this study, we investigate the sources of 
patients’ perceived uncertainty and its effect on their 
motivation to comply with providers’ decision on 
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treatment. Further, we evaluate the impact of the 
availability of patient health information and patient 
educational material on patients’ motivation to 
comply. We investigate the role of information 
systems in supporting the mitigation of uncertainty 
and in providing patient access to relevant 
information. Our recommendations may help 
providers to adopt certain features of existing 
electronic medical and health records systems to 
increase healthcare delivery effectiveness. Finally, we 
provide a foundation for regulations that may have an 
impact on health information system success in 
increasing patient compliance with providers’ orders. 
 
2. Research Model and Hypotheses 
 
We propose a theoretical model and six hypotheses, as 
shown in Figure 1. Using our proposed model, we 
examine the sources of patients’ perceived uncertainty 
and its direct and mediated impact on patients’ 
motivation to comply with providers’ orders. We 
propose that personal health information availability 
mediates the impact of perceived uncertainty on 
motivation to comply. We used previously collected 
qualitative data to identify constructs that either 
negatively or positively affect our proposed outcome 
variable, although we do recognize that other variables 
may affect patients’ motivation to comply. We also 
conducted a thorough review of the literature related 
to the identified constructs and propose three sources 
of perceived uncertainty and one indirect mediating 
effect on motivation to comply. We base our 
arguments on principal-agent theory, which includes 
the principles of hidden information and hidden action 
as the basis for uncertainty and the degree of disbelief 
about the legitimacy of the ordered treatment. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed theoretical model 
 
2.1 Patient Uncertainty and Motivation to 
Comply 
 
Uncertainty, by definition, is the inability to 
accurately predict an outcome due to lack of perfect 
information or time [22]. The literature refers to 
uncertainty in the provider-patient interaction as 
uncertainty of the treatment’s capability to improve 
patient’s health [23]. In this study, we refer to patients’ 
perceived uncertainty as the disbelief in providers’ 
diagnosis and recommended treatment due to lack of 
perfect information and perceived divergence of 
interests. Because the provider collects payment for 
services, regardless of the outcome, patients may feel 
that, due to differing provider reimbursement 
methods, they do not receive optimal treatment [24-
25].  
To better understand this phenomenon of 
uncertainty, including its sources, nature, and potential 
negative impact on patients’ motivation to comply 
with providers’ orders, we refer to the principal-agent 
perspective of agency theory. Uncertainty increases 
risk perception that influences patients’ perceived 
decrease in the treatment success outcome [26]. 
Perceived risk is generally found to erode a 
relationship in a transactional context [27] and to 
negatively influence the receiving party’s compliance 
[28]. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
H1: A higher degree of perceived uncertainty in 
providers’ actions decreases the motivation to comply 
with the providers’ orders.   
 
Due to patients’ very limited face-to-face time 
with their providers, they rely on additional health-
related information, which is perceived to be useful if 
it is relevant, complete, easily understandable, and 
adequate [31]. When patients have questions about the 
diagnosis or treatment, they find that it is a lengthy and 
burdensome process to talk to the physician and often 
get charged additional visit fees. As a result, they may 
feel uncertain about the quality or quantity of 
information that their provider shared with them [30]. 
Therefore, patients gather information from external 
sources, which makes them feel empowered [29]. The 
information asymmetry between the provider and 
patient can be mitigated by the patient’s acquiring 
additional health condition-specific information.  
The high rate of electronic health and medical 
records adoption by providers show the capacity of 
and promise to reduce healthcare costs and diagnosis 
errors, while increase efficiency. Electronic health and 
medical records provide access to personal health 
information and relevant patient education material, 
but the effect of these records on treatment efficiency 
has not received sufficient attention. Although the 
majority of patients are not health literate, having 
access to their visit notes, diagnosis, lab results, and 
treatment decisions, if presented in a coherent manner, 
may increase their engagement in their care and 
adherence to provider decisions [32]. Patients who are 
concerned about the diagnosis and treatment decision 
are more likely to reach for additional health 
information, and once they increase their health 
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literacy, they are more likely to comply with provider 
treatment decisions [33]. For the purposes of this 
study, we define personal health information 
availability as the proper access to relevant, reliable, 
adequate, and understandable information that 
increases patients’ heath literacy related to their health 
condition. We concentrate on patient access to their 
diagnosis and results as well as relevant patient 
education material that may be provided through the 
provider’s health information system. Therefore, we 
hypothesize the mediating effect of personal health 
information availability on the relationship between 
perceived uncertainty and patients’ motivation to 
comply with providers’ treatment orders. 
 
H2: A higher degree of perceived uncertainty in 
providers’ actions positively influences patients’ 
demand for personal health information availability. 
 
H3: A higher degree of personal health information 
availability positively influences patients’ motivation 
to comply with the providers’ orders. 
 
2.2. Uncertainty in Provider-Patient 
Relationship through Principal-Agent 
Perspective 
      
The imbalance of available information places the 
patient in a vulnerable position [43], which can be 
understood by the agent-principal perspective. This 
perspective has been applied in the healthcare setting 
to investigate the provider-patient relationship [35-
36]. As adopted from Pavlou et al. [37], the principal-
agent perspective is presented in Table 1, which 
presents the six requirements for the principal-agent 
theory to hold and includes the corresponding 
requirements for the provider-patient interaction. 
 
Table 1. Application of the principal-agent 
perspective in provider-agent interaction 
Principal-Agent  Provider-Patient Relationships 
Human Action 
Principal 
delegates 
authority or 
responsibility to 
an agent who 
acts on his or her 
behalf. 
The patient (principal) delegates 
responsibility to a provider (agent) 
to deliver services to improve 
patient’s health in exchange for 
payment. 
Divergence of Interests 
Principals and 
agents have 
different interests 
and goals. 
The patient wants to receive 
effective and high quality treatment 
for the least amount of money. 
Provider is motivated to receive as 
much payment as possible for the 
services, which may not be the most 
effective treatment options. 
Potential for Agent’s Gainful Exchange 
Possibility for 
agents to gain by 
shirking 
responsibility or 
acting 
opportunistically. 
The provider has the opportunity to 
diagnose the patient in a way that 
treatment choice would maximize 
provider’s benefit rather than 
improve patient’s health. 
Difficulty in Monitoring / Enforcing Human Action 
Principals cannot 
easily monitor 
agents and 
enforce their 
expected actions. 
The patient cannot easily monitor 
whether provider has made a proper 
or most appropriate diagnosis and 
treatment choice. 
Agents Not Bearing the Consequences of their Actions 
Agents act on 
behalf of 
principals who 
own the assets 
being managed. 
The provider has the freedom to 
diagnose a patient based on available 
information and choose an 
appropriate treatment deemed 
suitable by the provider. 
Temporal Duration 
There is a time 
lag in which the 
agent’s actions 
can be 
manifested. 
It may take a considerable amount of 
time before the effectiveness of 
diagnosis and chosen treatment 
effectiveness can be measured. 
There are many variables involved, 
and the responsibility of the provider 
narrows with the time lag. 
 
Mitigating uncertainty is highly dependent on 
trust, which has a rich literature in organizational 
behavior [27], information systems [38], social 
networks [39], buyer-seller relationships [40], 
economics [41], and doctor-patient relationships [42]. 
For the purposes of this study, we identify the sources 
of uncertainty and their mediating effect on patient 
motivation to comply with providers’ orders. Hence, 
we purposely omit trust, as it is unrealistic to assume 
that a patient can build trust with a provider after a 
brief meeting, particularly with a patient’s awareness 
of possible hidden information and hidden actions. 
To identify the sources of perceived uncertainty, 
we follow the literature and apply the relevant 
constructs through the principal-agent perspective. 
The known gap in knowledge between provider and 
patients [35] provides information asymmetry [43]. 
During the short face-to-face meeting with the 
provider, patients may not receive sufficient 
information to fully understand and accept the 
diagnosis and recommended treatment. There is 
certainly little time to challenge the provider’s 
findings due to the knowledge gap and often 
intimidating approach of providers [44]. Hence, we 
hypothesize:  
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H4: A higher degree of information asymmetry 
between providers and patients increases patients’ 
perceived uncertainty. 
 
When the principal-agent goals are incompatible 
and the hired agent may act in his or her own benefit, 
the principal may feel that his or her transaction 
provides an opportunity for the agent to act 
opportunistically. Because the principal cannot 
monitor the agent’s decisions and behavior, due to 
information asymmetry, opportunism may take place 
in the principal-agent transaction [45]. 
In the healthcare context, the provider may choose 
to diagnose the patient in a way that provides an 
opportunity for additional tests or medication that 
increases chargeable services and goods in addition to 
the necessary and adequate level, based on patients’ 
condition [46]. We define fear of opportunism as the 
patient’s concern that the provider acts 
opportunistically during their transaction. Angell [47] 
defined doctors as “double agents” who cannot be 
expected to “withhold beneficial care to save money 
for third-party payer.” However, it is difficult to 
monitor what is beneficial and necessary. Because 
patients are vulnerable to unfair diagnosis and 
treatment choices due to a costly and cumbersome 
overview for compliance, this provides the grounds for 
hidden actions on behalf of the providers, which 
increases patients’ uncertainty. Hence, we propose: 
 
H5: A higher degree of fear of provider opportunism 
positively influences patients’ perceived uncertainty. 
 
In this research, we identified provider quality 
based on Jayanti’s [48] constructs of empathy, 
communication, and competence. Thus, our 
evaluation goes beyond professional qualifications to 
involve the personal qualities of the provider as well. 
Patients’ agreeing with providers’ orders and 
complying with their treatment decision has been 
found to be positively correlated with physician 
empathy and communication [498]. Hence, we 
propose: 
 
H6: Higher patient perception of provider quality 
negatively influences patients’ perceived uncertainty. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
      
We selected the outpatient context for the 
provider-patient relationship to test the indicators and 
antecedents of perceived uncertainty and its effect on 
patients’ intention to comply with providers’ orders.  
 
3.1 Measurement Development and Survey 
Administration 
 
Measurement items were adopted from the literature 
and modified for the context of this study. All 
variables were measured indirectly by reflective, 
direct measurement items. We used a 5-point Likert-
scale that allowed respondents to express their level of 
agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
with the measurement items. The pilot study was 
administered to family members and friends as 
recommended by Churchill [50]. Based on pilot 
respondents’ feedback, face validity was reviewed and 
discussed by a group of experienced researchers. The 
final survey consisted of 41 measurement items 
(questions). Table 2 presents the measures and their 
sources from the literature. 
 
Table 2. Structural Model Measurement Items 
Measured Variable No. of 
Measures 
Supported by 
Literature 
Intention to Comply 5 [82-83] 
Perceived Uncertainty 4 [84]  
Perceived Information 
Asymmetry 
4 [37] [78] [79] 
Personal Health Record 
Quality 
16 [80] [31] 
Provider Quality 12 [38][48] [81-82] 
Health Info. Availability 4 [32] 
 
After revision of the questions, the final version 
was administered to respondents drawn from 
convenience and snowball sampling. Because most of 
us have been patients, we reached out to friends and 
asked them to complete the survey and to pass it on to 
others. We also used social media to promote the 
survey. A link to an online survey was provided, which 
included an explanation of the survey context and 
definitions of the variables, along with consent [51]. 
The data collection took place from May to August 
2015, and we received 217 responses, of which 184 
were fully completed.  
 
4. Data Analysis and Results 
 
Partial least squares (PLS) was used to validate 
and test our measurement and structural models, for 
which we used SmartPLS Statistical Software for 
Structural Equation Modeling (version 3.2.1 Windows 
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64 bit). The PLS statistical method, a component-
based latent structural equation modeling technique, 
provides more flexibility in terms of sample size and 
residual distribution [52-54].  
 
4.1 Measurement Validation 
 
Internal consistency exceeded 0.90 and was 
considered adequate for all principal constructs. We 
tested for construct validity through convergent 
(measures that should be related are, indeed, related) 
and discriminant (measures that should not be related 
are, indeed, not related) validity checks. The 
correlations among all constructs were below the 0.90 
threshold, but related to an extent, and almost all 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 
levels. The square root of average variance extracted 
(AVE) was greater than that of any other cross-
correlations, and AVEs were greater than the 0.5 
threshold, indicating that the principal constructs 
capture higher construct-related variance than error-
related variance. We also performed principal 
component factor analysis, which showed that all 
items loaded on their corresponding constructs and 
with higher factor loadings than cross-loadings. The 
confirmatory factor analysis confirmed that items 
loaded to their principal constructs with clear loading 
patterns.  
We tested for common method bias that may occur 
in self-report questionnaires due to something external 
to the measures. Bias can occur when one factor 
accounts for most of the variance due to item 
construction, item order, audience, scale used, and so 
forth [55]. As recommended by Podsakoff et al. [55], 
we employed Harman’s single factor test, using 
exploratory factor analysis as widely used in the 
literature [56-60]. We received nearly equal variance 
loadings across the factors; therefore, this test revealed 
no indication of common method bias. The previously 
performed correlation among constructs did not reveal 
an extreme correlation (>0.90), as the highest 
construct correlation was 0.74. We also tested for 
partial correlations, as suggested by Podsakoff et al. 
[55], whereby we added the highest loaded factor into 
the PLS model as another control factor. Because none 
of the dependent variables increased significantly, no 
common method bias was indicated using the partial 
correlation method, either. 
 
4.2 Control Variables 
 
We chose five control variables from the literature 
and had limited missing values returned for these 
control variables, which we handled through the mean 
imputation method [61]. We performed a complete 
control variable analysis prior to our research model 
analysis. Four control variables (gender, age, income, 
and health knowledge) had a significant relationship 
with one or more of the endogenous variables and 
were included in the final structural model to ensure 
that their effect was accounted for. Although their 
effect is statistically significant, they had limited effect 
on the structural model’s endogenous variables, which 
we measured through change in coefficient of 
determinants with and without the control variables 
(∆R2 < 0.1). 
 
4.3 Structural Model Test 
 
The structural model was tested against the 
hypotheses through path coefficients, statistical 
significance, and R-squared value. Path coefficients 
measure the strength of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, while the R-
squared values indicate the predictive power of the 
model [62]. A nonparametric bootstrapping technique 
was used to calculate the t-statistics values in 
SmartPLS to test for statistical significance of the path 
coefficients [63-64]. We used the full sample to test 
the six hypotheses that we developed. The 
standardized PLS path coefficients, R2, total and 
mediated effects, and control variables involved in 
testing the structural model are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Path coefficients in the structural model 
 
The standardized regression coefficients are 
generated first, followed by bootstrapping. 
Resampling with replacement at least 1,000 times is 
necessary for valid t-values, as suggested by Chin et 
al. [53]. R-squared (R2) values are reported for 
endogenous construct, as suggested Hulland [65]. 
As hypothesized, perceived uncertainty has a 
significant negative direct effect on motivation to 
comply (b = -0.267, p < 0.05) and supported H1. 
Perceived uncertainty also has a significant and 
relatively strong positive effect on personal health 
information availability (b = 0.376, p < 0.05), explains 
21 percent of its variance, and supports H2. Personal 
health information availability has a significant 
positive effect on motivation to comply (b = 0.591, p 
< 0.01), which explains 36% of its variance and 
supports H3. 
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The indicators of perceived uncertainty explained 
48 percent of its variance. Unexpectedly, the perceived 
information asymmetry has a relatively week but 
significant negative effect on perceived information 
asymmetry (b = -0.107, p < 0.05) and does not support 
H4. Fear of opportunism has a strong significant 
positive (b = 0.621, p < 0.05) effect on perceived 
uncertainty and confirms H5. As hypothesized, 
physician quality (b = -0.537, p < 0.01) showed a 
strong negative, significant relationship with 
perceived uncertainty and validated H6.  
 
4.4 Mediation Analysis 
 
Mediation occurs when a specific intervention 
influences an outcome and takes on a temporal and 
causal relationship. Mediation analysis may help to 
determine a more successful and cost-effective 
approach when developed using a proper prior theory 
and within the appropriate context. 
When a predictor variable’s significant effect on 
the outcome variable weakens through the 
introduction of a third variable, the mediator, an 
indirect or mediated effect is supported [66]. Full or 
complete mediation exists when the significant effect 
between the predictor and outcome variables become 
zero by adding the mediator variable. If the effect or 
relationship is reduced in size, partial mediation exists 
[67]. 
To test the mediating effect of personal health 
information availability, we followed Baron and 
Kenny’s [66] test for mediation. We directly linked the 
perceived uncertainty construct to motivation to 
comply and removed the personal health information 
availability construct. The relationship between 
perceived uncertainty and motivation to comply 
showed a significant negative effect (b = -0.489, p < 
0.05). Once the personal health information 
availability construct was added back to the model, the 
effect decreased to b = -0.267. Following Baron and 
Kenny (1986), we performed bootstrapping for the 
valid t-value. We captured the mediator path 
coefficients (b1 = 0.376, b2 = 0.591) and standard errors 
(SE1=0.0736, SE1=0.0813) from perceived 
uncertainty to personal health information availability 
and, from there, to the motivation to comply. We used 
a free Sobel Test Calculator for the Significance of 
Mediation [68] and received a Sobel test statistic of 
4.179, of which the absolute value is greater than 1.96 
(p < 0.05). This revealed that personal health 
information availability partially mediates perceived 
uncertainty’s effect on motivation to comply, as the 
direct effect between perceived uncertainty and 
motivation to comply decreased when the mediator 
was added in the integrative model [66].  
Combining all this information, we can conclude 
that, of the -0.489 unit difference in motivation to 
comply that is attributable to a unit difference in 
perceived uncertainty, 0.222 of it is the result of the 
mediator effect of personal health information 
availability, which increases health literacy, which, in 
turn, increases motivation to comply with providers’ 
order. The remaining -0.267 unit difference is direct, 
spurious, or attributable to other indirect effects not 
explicitly modeled [69]. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In this study, we examined the sources of perceived 
uncertainty and its effect on motivation to comply with 
providers’ orders through the principal-agent 
perspective. We also investigated the mediating effect 
of personal health information availability. Using the 
PLS method, we developed a structural model and six 
hypotheses, which were empirically validated with 
184 respondents who provided their input on the latent 
variables that we measured.  
This study has several key findings with 
meaningful theoretical and practical implications. We 
formally proposed that the process of diagnosing 
symptoms, identifying course of treatments, and 
ordering self-delivered care should be viewed as 
agency relationships, whereby the proposed principal-
agent perspective applies in the provider-patient 
transaction process. The hidden information and 
action principles of the principal-agent perspective 
helped us to identify the sources of perceived 
uncertainty. This understanding can be applied to the 
mitigation of perceived uncertainly to achieve better 
patient motivation to comply. The mediator of 
personal health information availability also may be 
used to help reduce the two underlying fundamental 
agency problems. 
This paper’s primary contribution is to introduce 
personal health information availability as a key 
mediating variable in a model, which incorporates the 
agent-principal perspective, that explains patient 
motivation to comply with providers’ orders. Patients’ 
compliance has a great impact on the health of patients 
and on healthcare costs. Studies that examine the 
provider-patient relationship through a principal-agent 
perspective are driven by health economics principles 
developed by Mitnick and Ross’s [70, 77] relational 
and institutions-based incentives-driven approach. We 
add to the patient-provider relationship literature by 
testing the precursors of perceived uncertainty in 
healthcare, which is a precursor to patient motivation 
to comply with providers’ orders. These relationships 
have been overlooked in the literature, as information 
availability has been limited to the Internet [8] or face-
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to-face provider-patient communication [71]. With 
widely available and patient-accessible patient portals 
and education materials accessible or given at the time 
of provider visits, it is important to evaluate the 
transparent personal health records’ and patients’ 
health-related information’s impact on patient 
compliance intention.  
Studies that attempt to explain patient adherence 
[72-76] without an understating of the mediating role 
of personal health information availability, and its 
precursors and nature, likely result in incomplete and 
potentially misleading theories. In this study, we 
identified three factors—perceived information 
asymmetry, fear of opportunism, and provider 
quality—that may potentially mitigate perceived 
uncertainty by helping to uncover the hidden actions 
and hidden information.  
We identified and described, on a more granular 
level, the process that develops and potentially 
mitigates perceived uncertainty and the mediator that 
facilitates patient motivation to comply. We proposed 
fear of opportunism and information asymmetry as 
factors in the agent-principal perspective, and this 
study is the first to use these constructs as indicators 
of perceived uncertainty in healthcare. The third 
variable, provider quality, has been studied as a latent 
variable in other studies [8] but has not been 
previously used as an indicator of perceived 
uncertainty.  
The strong positive effect (b = 0.621, p < 0.05) of 
fear of opportunism on perceived uncertainty is driven 
by patients who believe that doctors act in their own 
interests when adding chargeable services or products. 
Educating such patients during and after their visit, by 
providing proper access to relevant and 
understandable information related to their personal 
health condition, may greatly reduce patients’ 
uncertainty about the recommended treatment and 
increase the motivation to comply with the ordered 
treatment. 
The unexpected negative effect of perceived 
information asymmetry (b = -0.107, p < 0.05) may be 
due to the fact that patients often feel “lost” after 
talking to the doctor and blame themselves for not 
fully understanding what the doctor told them. In that 
case, they believe that the doctor is right and decrease 
their uncertainty about the diagnosis and treatment 
decision. We recommend to increase the health 
literacy by providing access to personal health 
information and relevant educational material. 
 
6. Limitations and Future Directions 
 
The principal-agent perspective has been 
developed and widely used in understanding the 
employer-employee relationship. We indicated the six 
key theoretical requirements that must be satisfied in 
the patient-provider service transaction approach, but 
this perspective will require further research to 
confirm its fit in the patient-provider context.  
We excluded the possible moderating relationship 
of a “second opinion,” which is a major factor in terms 
of reducing uncertainty. Although this option is freely 
available to any patient, most patients, due to the 
additional cost and time involved, do not take 
advantage of this for less complicated healthcare 
needs. An extension of this study could be an 
evaluation of whether providers consider the 
possibility of other professionals’ viewing their 
decision and the extent to which it limits their possible 
opportunism. This could take place the monitoring of 
agent behavior for compliance and fairness. 
Furthermore, engaging in multiple doctor visits may 
develop a level of comfort in the patient if previous 
treatment plans were effective and successful.  It may 
be worthwhile to introduce the moderating effect of 
“second-opinions” and multiple doctor visits into our 
proposed model. 
The use of snowball sampling helped with the 
response rate and resulted in low-cost data collection. 
It could, however, have introduced bias into the 
sample responses, as many respondents referred 
another respondent to complete the survey, thereby 
limiting the generalizability of the findings. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we found that patient utilization of 
electronic health and medical records, which provides 
patient insight into provider decisions, coupled with 
provider-supplied relevant educational material, may 
potentially reduce perceived uncertainty and increase 
patients’ motivation to comply with providers’ orders. 
We recommended the use of health information 
technology to possibly increase patient compliance. 
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